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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WIL.MITH J. REES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
MURRAY CF£.lY BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION, .a corporate body, and WENDELL 
C. DAY, EARL HEALY, DAVID B. 
McCLEERY, PAD"L S. ROSE, LAW-
RENCE P. PARRY, J. EASTON PAR-
RATT and VARIAN :MORTENSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
C~e No. 
8586 
This is an appeal fro1n a Smnmary Judgment Order 
by the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge of the Third Judi-
cial District Court, in f.avor of all defendants and 
against plaintiff on her First Cause of Action, no cause 
for action, and in favor of all defendants except J. 
Easton Parratt and Varian Mortenson and against 
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plaintiff on her Second Cause of Action, no cause for 
action. 
The entire record below was designated for this 
appeal. 
The appellant, Wihnith J. Rees, wa:s first employed 
in 1949 by the Murray City Board of Education as a 
teacher in Murray High School for the 1949-50 school 
year. Similar contracts were made for the school years 
1950-51, 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1953-54, copies of which 
were filed with the Complaint (R. 6-10). 
On March 29, 1954, without having any previous 
warning from the Board of Education, appellant received 
the following letter from Superintendent J. Easton 
Parratt ( R. 39) : 
''Dear l\{rs. Rees : 
You, no doubt, are making plans for next 
year. Accordingly the Board of Education is of 
the opinion that it would be to your interest to 
know that the board is not planning on entering 
into a new contract ·with you for the school year 
1954-55. 
'V e are pleased to have had the opportunity 
of working and becmuing acquainted with you 
during the past few years. 
Very truly yours, 
J. Easton Parratt 
Superintendent & Clerk" 
llistorically, .all teacher contracts by the Murray City 
Board of Education provided that each teacher will be 
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given "notice of unsatisfactory work on or before April 
1 of the school year." (R. 6-10, paragraph 5 of each 
contract). 
On April 8, 1954, after receiving this notice, Mrs. 
Rees requested a hearing before the J\!Iurray City Board 
of Education at its next Ineeting (R. 54). On May 13, 
1954, after some postponements, appellant appeared at 
the Arlington School, Murray, Utah, at 7:30 o'clock P.M. 
with her counsel for the purpose of protesting the board's 
action and found the board had met between the hours of 
7:00 o'clock P.M. and 7:25 o'clock P.M. that evening, and 
were not available at 7:30 o'clock P.M. for appellant's 
hearing. This was later claimed to be a misunderstand-
ing by the board of education (R. 60). Aware that she 
was getting the run around and her efforts for reinstate-
ment were futile, J\IIrs. Rees commenced this action on 
July 8, 1954, alleging the l\iurray City Board of Educa-
tion's action was wrong, that the board should be en-
joined from discharging her, and that the actions of the 
board in refusing to issue her a new contract for the next 
school year be declared null and void. Her Complaint al-
so sought damages against the board members, superin-
tendent and principal individually for malicous interfer-
ence with appellant's contractual rights (R. 11). Defend-
ants' Motion for Summary Judgment was heard June 
11, 1956. No testimony was taken, but all of the plead-
ings, exhibits, .affidavits and depositions of the parties 
were made of record. 
Mrs. Rees's allegations of fact in her Complaint (R. 
1-5) and her supporting Affidavits (R. 48-50), though 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contradicted by Affidavits filed by the defendants must 
be accepted as true on a b1otion for Summary J udg-
ment.1 
Appellant sets forth the facts from this standpoint. 
I. APPELLANT AT ALL TIMES RENDERED SATIS-
FACTORY SERVICE AS A TEACHER. 
Wilmith Rees, a United States citizen and a resident 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, graduated from the University 
of Utah in 1949, and at all times held a profes~ional 
certificate as provided by state law in order to qualify 
as a teacher in the public schools of Utah. She was em-
ployed as a home economics teacher and performed her 
responsibilities satisfactorily. With the consent and ap-
proval of the ~Iurray City Board of Education, while so 
employed, she served as first Vice President and later as 
President of the Murray Education Association; was a 
member of the Utah State !lome Economics Committee, 
Murray City High School Special Building Committee, 
Murray City Schools Survey Committee and Murray 
City Guidance Conunittee. Added to these activities, 
she performed other extra curricular duties for the Mur-
ray City High School, with the consent of the Board, 
in school fashion shows, cmumencement exercises, girls' 
league, Freshn1an Advisory and Report Card Committee 
activities. 
1. Furton v. City of Mena~ha, ·C.C.A. 7 1945; 149 F. 2d 945; 
Cert. denied, 327 U.S. 771. On defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, court must accept allegation of Complaint as true. 
Facts must be accepted as true though contradicted by affidavit 
filed by defendants. 
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Mrs. Rees alleged in her Affidavit (R. 49) that at no 
tin1e did her superintendent, principal or anyone else 
ever give her notice of unsatisfactory work, and she 
further denied specifically each and every implication 
raised by counter affidavits filed by defendants Exhibits 
I, J, K, L (R. 35-38) wherein the Board of Education at-
tempted to suggest that she was not performing satis-
factorily. 
The trial judge at the hearing on Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, aware that just cause for dismissing 
Mrs. Rees was lacking, requested that counsel for the 
board concede for the purpose of that hearing that, "Mrs. 
Rees was discharged because she played around with 
the Teachers' Union." Mrs. Rees's allegation that she 
"rendered satisfactory and successful service to said 
Murray City High School and Murray City Board of 
Education" (R. 3) Inust be taken in a light most favorable 
to her. 
II. INDUCEMENTS HELD OUT TO MRS. REES TO 
BECOME A TEACHER. 
~Irs. Rees's Affidavit (R. 49) alleged that it was her 
understanding when employed by Dr. James Clove, then 
Superintendent of the Murray City Board of Education, 
that there was, in effect, a tenure policy for its teachers 
which was as set forth in defendants' Exhibits A and B 
(R. 22, 23), and in her Exhibit 1 (R. 51), and that upon 
rendering three years satisfactory status as a teacher 
she would acquire by contractual right with the Murray 
City Board of Education the tenure right to hold her 
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job, together with a right to an orderly dismissal pro-
cedure if the board attempted either to discharge her or 
not to renew her contracts. Dr. Clove's deposition admits 
Mrs. Bees's understanding and reliance of the policy, 
explaining Exhibit A & B (R. 22, 23) to conform to the 
Board of Education's tenure policy. (See Clove Deposi-
tion, p. 6 commencing at line 15 and extending through 
line 23 of p. 8.) 
III. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AS A TENURE TEACHER. 
1frs. Rees filed with her }lotion in opposition, the 
Affidavit of Herrick S. Roth, Vice President of the 
American Federation of Teachers, setting forth defini-
tions of the tern1s Dr. Clove's employment letter raised. 
"Probation period" and "tenure" have the following 
meaning (R. 59) : 
"The word 'tenure' when applied to the em-
ploynlent of a teacher indicates that the teacher 
will be employed fron1 the date of achieving ten-
ure, continuou.sly fron1 year to year, until such 
time as the teacher reaches the retirement age for 
the school district." 
"The tenn does not ilnply that the teacher 
shall never be subject to disn1issal once he has 
attained the status of tenure. Tenure does pro-
vide for an orderly procedure for determining 
whether or not a disn1issal of a teacher who has 
attained the status of tenure is warranted by the 
board of education." 
"* ·' * that a hearing should be had after notice 
gj YPn to the teacher concerning grounds for re-
Bwv.al or non-rene\\·al of the contract. •••" 
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"The burden of proof of dismissal or non-
renewal rests with those who bring the charge." 
Mrs. Rees denied that the term "Probation period" 
or "Tenure" had the meaning alleged to be given those 
terms by Me.ssrs. Par~att, Day and Parry in their affi-
davits supporting their motion. Mrs. Rees further al-
leged that following her three year probation period she 
acquired tenure, and that this policy was a long standing 
policy of the Murray City Board of Education; that such 
a policy had been recognized during her employment re-
garding the non-renewal of another tenure teacher (a 
Mr. Tremayne). 
Mrs. Rees also denied that the tenure policy was not 
applicable to married teachers and alleged that the ac-
tion by the bo.ard was not predicated on the ground that 
she was replaced for a single female teacher or that the 
married women's rule had any materiality or relevancy 
to the matter. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' ARBITRARY ACTIONS. 
Notwithstanding Mrs. Rees's beter than average 
record of service to her high school .and community from 
1949, Mur~ay Board of Education, acting upon Super-
intendent Parratt's and Principal ~Iortenson's recom-
mendation, filed its dismissal notice two days before the 
final date allowed by the contract, without giving any 
reason for their action, and refusing Mrs. Rees the 
orderly hearing required by ordinary justice (R. 60) . 
. Mrs. Rees continued to request reinstatmnent by the 
.:\lurray City Board throughout, continues to hold a good 
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S'tanding teacher's certificate and continues to this date 
to be without employment as a teacher, although she has 
.applied to the Salt Lake City Board, Jordan Board and 
the Granite School Board, an alarming conrmentary in 
itself when viewed in connection with the admitted criti-
cal shortage of competent teachers in this state. 
V. STATUTES. 
School laws of Utah are silent regarding teacher 
tenure. Section 53-6-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
broadly provides: 
"Every board of education shall have power 
and authority *** to construct and erect school 
buildings and to furnish the same • • • and may 
do all things needful for the maintenance, pros-
perity .and success of the schools and the promo-
tion of education; and may adopt by-laws and 
rules for its own procedure, and make and enforce 
all needful rules and regulations for the control 
and management of the public schools of the dis-
trict.'' 
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953, First Special Ses-
sion, p. 70, provides : 
.. Bo.ards of education of local school districts 
Inay enter into written contracts for the employ-
ment of personnel for tenns not to exceed five 
years, provided that nothing in the tenus of such 
contracts shall restrict the power of such local 
boards to tenninate such contracts for cause at 
any time." 
This law was approved Dece1nber 9, 1953, and became 
effective February 18, 1954. 
10 
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.... J\..ttention is also directed to Utah State Teachers' 
Retirement Fund created by Chapter 20, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE .COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED TO BE 
FULLY TRIED ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. Plaintiff's Allegation that She was a Tenure 
Teacher and had Acquired the Contractual Benefits of 
Tenure was a ~1:-aterial Fact in Controversy. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO PREVAIL AS 
A MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. In Establishing Tenure for its Teachers under 
Contract of Employment, Murray City School Board was 
not Acting Ultra Vires. 
B. 1\Iurray City School Board failed to Act in 
Accordance with its own Rules Regarding Orderly Dis-
missal of a r:l1enure Teacher. 
C. The Contract Covering the School Year 1953-54 
was not Lacking in :Mutuality. 
11 
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D. The :Married 'reacher Rule did not Bar Appel-
lant from Benefits of Tenure Program. 
POINT III. 
THE ·COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY HOLD-
ING THAT MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
COULD NOT INDIVIDUALLY BE LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS 
AND WILLFUL INTERFERENCE WITH APPELLANT'S 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ·COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED TO BE 
FULLY TRIED ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. Plaintiff's Allegation that She was a Tenure 
Teacher and had Acquired the Contractual Benefits of 
Tenure was a :Material Fact in Controversy. 
Like a general den1urrer under fonner rules of 
pleading, the Motion for Sununary J udgn1ent cuts at 
the he,art of appellant's claiin. Like a general den1urrer, 
the Motion for Su1mnary J udgn1ent concedes the facts 
alleged to be true. Sunnuary Judg1nent is not a substi-
tute for trial. It only deter1nines whether there are issues 
to be tried. Barron and Holtzolf, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Vol. 3, p. 61. 
':Phe emnplaint, supporting affidavits and deposi-
12 
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tions of Dr. Clove rai.se genuine and material issues of 
fact, and the Court below should have accepted these 
allegations as true although contradicted by affidavits 
filed by defendants. lVIrs. Rees alleged the existence of a 
tenure policy and an orderly dismissal procedure. The 
contracts and docurnents which created this right ac-
companied her oomplaint. 
Comntencing with the first contract (R. 6) and run-
ning through each of the renewals except Exhibit E (R. 
10), paragraph 4 of each contract provided: 
"This contract may be cancelled by mutual 
agreement, and by the Board of Educ.ation for 
imnlorality, incompetence, insubordination, and 
mental or physical incapacity. It is agreed that 
there shall be no discharge without a thorough 
investigation and a hearing before the board." 
As far as can be determined, this had been the standard 
procedure in the Murray City School Board for some 
years prior to 1949. 
Each contract provided: 
"5. That you will be given notice of un-
satisfactory work on or before April 1 of the 
school year." 
The contract for the year 1953-54 carried a slightly 
different provision: 
"4. It is agreed and under.stood that each 
person performing services hereunder rnay termi-
nate his service relationship at any time upon his 
giving written notice of such inte11tion and the 
effective date thereof to the Board at least ten 
days prior to the proposed effective date of termi-
13 
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nation. Such notice 1nay be 1nailed or delivered 
to the Superintendent." 
The reason for this language requires explanation. 
At the com1nencement of the 1953-54 school year in Sep-
tember, there was considerable agitation for improving 
teachers' salaries throughout the state. Boards of educa-
tion were unable to offer teachers adequate contracts, 
and throughout the state many teachers and their asso-
ciations refused to sign these contracts in time for the 
new school year. This resulted in the call of a special 
legislative session December 1, 1953, entirely devoted 
to the solution of this problem. In order to show good 
faith, Boards of Education throughout the state drafted 
this language which, in effect, said to a teacher, if we 
cannot get a satisfactory adjustment from the state legis-
lature, you may resign on ten day's notice. 
In this context, it is submitted that paragraph 4 of 
the agreement of 1953-54 did not alter the previous basic 
conditions that there could be no unilateral discharge 
without a thorough investigation and hearing before the 
board. It is urged these conditions becrune part of the 
1953-54 contract, as effectively as if expressly written 
therein for those teachers who had passed their proba-
tionary period. 
Dr. J an1es Clove, fonner superintendent of the 
board, hired ~irs. Rees. Hi~ forthright deposition .admits 
that his hiring letter of April ~1, 1949, (R. 22) and the 
docmnent entitled the Orderly Dis1nissal of Teachers, 
Exhibit D (R. ~5-27), was standard operating proc-edure 
in the ~lnrray City School Board. Nowhere in the affi-
14 
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davit or the depositions of the pre.sent board or their 
officers is there evidence that the policy under Dr. Clove 
had been changed, altered or rescinded. This indicates 
that the policy was acceptable and continued in effect. 
(See Appeal of Black, 287 P. 2d 96, 101. Contract can-
not be annulled by succeeding board members.) 
What is the meaning of this language if not to gr.ant 
tenure to Mrs. Rees 1 "The Board of Education has ex-
tended the probationary period of new teachers from one 
year to three years to obtain tenure." This phrase is 
again recited in the letter of April 19, 1950, Exhibit B 
(R. 23), which accompanied the second contract Mrs. 
Rees received from the board. Examine Dr. Clove's 
deposition (P. 15, line 9 through page 17, line 14): 
"Q. So that when you wrote this letter that we 
have referred to earlier, advising teachers 
that their probationary period would be ex-
tended from one to three years to obtain 
tenure, you were meaning the kind of tenure 
-not legal tenure-that came as an incident 
of this three-page document? 
A. That's right. 
Q. In other words, before a teacher could be dis-
charged she would have to be discharged 
through .some orderly dismissal procedure Y 
A. As far as I was concerned, that was true. 
Q. And was that policy followed in any example 
during your term? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what cases? 
A. Well, only one case that I ever dismissed a 
15 
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teacher was a teaoher by the name of Tre-
mayne, and we followed it there. 
Q. Just exactly what was the procedure you fol-
lowed in Mr. Tremayne's case1 I don't care 
to know the issues or the merits of it. 
A. I wrote him a letter that he would not be re-
employed; that in our opinion he was not a 
capable teacher. That was his first year, and 
there was still no need for taking it before the 
board, according to this professional proced-
ure. However, he requested it and it was 
granted. 
Q. And you went through the whole formal pro-
cedure! 
A. True. 
Q. Gave him a hearing? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And you presented the Board's position and 
he presented his po.sition Y 
A. That's true. 
Q. And at the end of that, a decision was -
A. It was unfavorable to the teacher. The Board 
backed up our judgment. 
Q. I see. X ow, was there any other case of a dis-
missal of a teacher during your tern1 1 
A. No, no dis1nissal. A dozen teachers, however, 
resigned at my suggestion during those years. 
It was 1ny poliry that when a teacher was not 
doing what 1 considered good work to tell 
the teacher in a conference that I thought it 
wa.~ for the best interests· of the teacher and 
the district that the~· try s01nething else, go 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to another district, .and that the best proced-
ure for the teacher would be to write a letter 
stating that they didn't, that they were re-
signing, didn't want to come back next year, 
and that I'd write them a letter accepting 
their resignation. That put it all on record 
as .a resignation and no dismissal. 
Q. So that in those instances no-
A. It was officially resignation. 
Q. Resignation rather than dismissal. 
A. That's true. 
Q. But even in those cases where this resignation 
procedure was involved, you had some dis-
cussions prior to the resignation letter advis-
ing the teacher of her unsatisfactory conduct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did the Murray Board of Education know 
about the Tremayne incident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did they support the action you took on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did they permit you to go through the pro-
cedure you used~ 
A. Yes, ~ir." 
"Recommended Procedure for the Orderly Dismissal 
of Teachers" was the policy and practice used during Dr. 
Clove's term as superintendent. See Clove Deposition, 
p. 18, line 12 through 18. 
In addition to that, Exhibit H adopted by the Mur-
ray City School Board in 1946 (R. 32, 33) attached to 
the salary schedule (R. 34), provided: 
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"V. Teachers Demerits 
1. Teachers whose work is rated by the 
Principal and Superintendents as being 
below the standard expected in Murray 
City Schools may be denied their annual 
increment. 
2. If the quality of work is rated below ave-
rage for a two-year consecutive period, 
the teacher shall not be given a contract 
of re-en1ployn1ent in the Murray City 
Schools. Such teachers will be given a 
notice before April 1st if their work is 
below average and that they are not en-
titled to their annual raises." 
For the purpose of meeting her burden at the Sum-
mary Judgment hearing, :Mrs. Rees certainly established 
a prima facie case for tenure, and having acquired the 
incidence of that contractual relationship established 
genuine and material issues of fact that should have been 
fully tried, not disposed of simply because defendants' 
affidavits contradicted these facts. 
It is, of course, conceded that if defendants were 
entitled to prevail as a n1atter of law, the Court below 
did not err. This proposition will now be examined. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMl\lARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO PREVAIL AS 
A MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. In Establishing Tenure for its Teachers under 
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Contract of Employment, 1furray City School Board was 
not Acting Ultra Vires. 
It is common knowledge since World War II, this 
state has faced a serious teacher shortage primarily be-
cause of inability to pay teachers adequate wages and 
permit conditions comparable to those offered by other 
industries in other states. Tenure for teachers is 
based upon the public policy of protecting the educa-
tional interest of the state and not upon the policy of 
granting special privileges to teachers as a class or as 
individuals. Consequently, tenure should be strictly con-
strued against the boards and liberally construed to af-
fect the high purpose of this public policy. 
So, to 1neet this competition, Utah School Boards 
attempted to better teachers' conditions within the pub-
lic interest. Tenure had been under consideration for 
many years, when in November, 1947, as an outgrowth 
of the resolutions made at a leadership convention at 
Cedar City, there was appointed a joint committee repre-
senting the State School Board As.sociation and the 
Utah Education Association which studied the problems 
and submitted its approved recommendations September 
13, 1947. This constituted the recommended orderly dis-
missal procedure for teachers which was adopted by 
about three-fourths of our .school districts in this state. 
See The Administration of Public Education by Dr. John 
T. Wahlquist, published by the Ronald Press Company, 
~ew York, Chapter 7, p. 241: 
"Many states and school systems have worked 
out procedures to be followed in the dismissal of 
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teachers. In Utah, for instance, the State School 
Board Association and the Utah Education Asso-
ciation have cooperated in working out a proced-
ure which has been adopted by about three-fourths 
of the sehool districts in the state. The procedure 
defines the grounds for dismissal, provides that 
written notice of intended dismissal be given to 
the teacher, and stipulates that the teacher may 
request a hearing before the board of education 
before final decision on the dismissal is made. 
"Even though the problems discussed above 
are influenced in large measure by state legisla-
tion and state board of education rulings, local 
superintendents and principals can do much to 
make this area of personnel administration more 
effective. Regardless of tenure status, adminis-
trators, by their actions and programs, can give 
teachers a feeling of security. Adequate super-
vision, particularly during the probationary peri-
od, can be provided. Board policies on retirement 
ages, the teaching of controversial issues, and dis-
missal procedures can be fair and liberal." 
Dr. Clove's deposition clearly establishes that the 
Murray Board, by implication at least, adopted a similar 
orderly dismissal procedure and held out this t.enure pro-
gram as an induce1nent to Mrs. Rees to accept employ-
ment in its public school. 
The school board injected into the relationship be-
tween !1:rs. Rees and itself her unexpressed right for 
tenure by an implied contract that on the contingency 
her relationship continued satisf·actorily for at least 
three years, then she wa~ COilsidered a permanent teacher. 
Should it be urged in the year 1956 the power of a 
~chool board .. to maintain it~ schools;· Section 53-6-20, 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, limits the implied powers of 
a board to adopt such a relationship between itself and 
its teachers~ 
See Allen u. Board of Education, 236 P. 2d 75: 
"The Board of Education, being a creature 
of the legislature, has *** such implied powers as 
are necessary to execute and earry into execution 
its implied powers.'' 
This Court in Backman v. Bateman, 263 P. 2d 561, 
struck down an act of the legislature because it infringed 
upon a vested tenure right to retirement by a high school 
principal. 
Defendants' counsel cited in the court below, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
"Boards of Education may appoint all other 
officers that in their judgment may be necessary 
to fully carry out the provisions of this title for 
the protection and improvement of school prop-
erty and for the promotion of the interests of the 
schools may 'remove them at pleasure and may re-
quire any such officer to give a bond to the board 
in such sum as it may prescribe." 
Arguing this provision gives the school board unlimited 
authority to re1nove any teacher at its pleasure. This 
section applies only to officers of the board and not to 
employees. The position of a teacher in the public school 
is not a public office but an employ1nent by contract be-
tween the teacher and the school corporation. The rela-
tionship is contractual. l,his section may not be applied 
against teachers; only against officers of the board. 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See School District No. 311 v. Wanamaker, (Wash.) 
281 p. 2d 846. 
It was also urged below that Laws of Utah, 1953, 
First Special Session, Chapter 29, now cited as Section 
53-4-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, constitutes a limita-
tion against the Board. This section provides: 
"Boards of Education, or local school dis-
tricts, may enter into written contracts for the 
employment of personnel for terms not to exceed 
five years ; provided that nothing in the terms of 
such contracts shall restrict the power of such 
local boards to terminate such contracts for cause 
at any time." 
This is not inconsistent with our case. The 1953 act, 
appellant contends, was not intended as a limitation on 
the existing and implied powers of the board. The legis-
lature was certainly aware that since 1948, nearly three-
fourths of Utah school districts had adopted a tenure 
program and an orderly dismissal procedure. Neither 
the message of the Governor, recommendations of the 
legislative counsel, nor debates in the legislature are 
helpful in determining whether or not this act was deter-
mined as a grant of new power or limitation of existing 
and implied powers of the board. \V e contend that since 
many schools in Utah had adopted tenure procedures 
previous to 1953, the boards exercised the power to so 
contract, and the above statutory provision was not a 
liinitation on their power, but rnerely an .authority to 
enter into written contracts for a tern1 of five years. 
This is not inconsistent with the established practice 
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of re-e1nploying a teacher on a year-to-year basis if she 
perforn1s satisfactorily. 
This Court's .attention is further called to the under-
lined portion of the statute which provides: 
"To terminate such contracts for cause at any 
tirrt,e." 
Here again our legislature recognizes that just cause 
must appear even if a contract for five years may be 
terminated. Certainly, the principles of justice and fair 
play require some hearing after notice given to the party 
sought to be tenninated, dis1nissed or non-renewed. Our 
legislature thus requires a hearing before "just cause 
for termination'' is proven to exist. 
Even in the absence of teacher tenure statutes, the 
Supre1ne Court of Wyoming holds: 
"The majority of the Courts ~eem to hold 
that in the absence of .a contract permitting re-
moval at pleasure, principles of justice require 
that a hearing should be given to the party sought 
to be removed and we shall assume for the pur-
pose of this case that in order to make the decision 
of the school board of any effect a hearing upon 
notice was necessary." (See Tracy v. School Dis-
trict No. 5, 243 P. 2d 932.) 
In Baird, 298 Pac. 313, that Court held: 
"According to the Durst case, removal of a 
teacher may be only for cause, and we may .as-
sume, as heretofore stated, that it should be only 
upon notice and hearing." 
~ln;. Rees was not charged with any unsatisfactory 
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conduct nor was she allowed any of the fundamental 
elements necessary for a fair hearing. 
Furthermore, since appellant's rights arose out of 
a contract with the Murray Board as the outgrowth of 
existing and implied powers and not statutory grants, 
it is urged that her right of tenure is not capable of being 
dissolved by an act of the legislature even if this Court 
construes Laws of Utah, 1953, Chapter 29, First Special 
Session, as the only power of the board. A case in point 
has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in favor of a school teacher. See State ex rel 
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, reversing the Indiana 
Supreme Court, 5 N.E. 2d 531. The Indiana Court held 
teacher tenure rights as being a creature of the legis-
lature. The Supreme Court of the United States held 
otherwise: 
"The teacher tenure_ rights were contractual 
and could not be impaired by a subsequent act of 
the legislature." 
Mrs. Rees urges, therefore, that this last enactment 
of the legislature cannot in1pair her vested right to tenure 
which she obtained through a contract commencing in 
1949, and continuing each year through 1953. 
The full power and prestige of our state is being 
used to encourage high level education and teachers to 
do a better job. Recently a teacher retirement program 
has been adopted hy this state which recognizes that 
teachers 1nay be cmnpetent to serve until sixty and sixty-
five year~ of age. Utah sehool boards did not require a 
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grant of legislative power to encourage teachers job 
security and tenure. They have exercised this power all 
along and their action is not without authority. 
Anticipating that defendants would argue as they 
did below that without a legislative grant of authority, 
boards of education may only enter into contracts within 
the term of office of that board, appellant makes the fol-
lowing argument. 
In the absence of a statutory provision limiting 
either expressly or by implication, the time for which a 
contract of employment of a school teacher may be made 
to a period within the contracting school board's or offi-
cers' term of office, such board or officers may bind their 
successors in office by employing a teacher or superin-
tendent for a period extending beyond their term of 
office. See Appeal of Black, 298 P. 2d 96; 78 C.J.S. 185, 
pp. 1038-39. 
In Corum v. Common School District 1Vo. 21 (Idaho, 
1935) 47 P. 2d 889, it was held: 
"It is also contended that the contract was in-
valid by re~ason of the fact that it was entered 
into prior to the annual school meeting, at which 
a change in the personnel of the board occurred, 
for services to cornn1ence and to be performed 
after the annual n1eeting. This contention cannot 
he upheld. The board of trustees of a co1nmon 
school district has the power and it is its duty to 
employ certified teachers on written contract in 
form approved by the state board of educ~ation. 
I.C.A. paragraphs 32-615, subd. 1. The board is a 
continuous body or entity; the corporation contin-
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ues unchanged and has the power to contract; its 
contracts are contracts of the board and not of its 
individual members ; and the board can make a 
valid contract with a teacher for a tenn of school 
to begin in the next succeeding school year and 
after the term of one of the trustees has expired." 
This is the general rule, provided the contract is 
made in good faith, without fraud or collusion and for a 
reasonable period of time. 
It cannot be successfully argued that a tenure pro-
gram for teachers which is designed to continue her 
annual contract from year to year until she reaches her 
retirement age of sixty-five is unreasonable. Rather, it 
must be conceded that such stability of employment is a 
desirable thing and that boards of education are not 
acting outside of their authority in establishing such 
practice even in the absence of permissive legislation. 
B. Murray City School Board failed to Act in 
Accordance with its own Rules Regarding Orderly Dis-
missal of a Tenure Teacher. 
If it is accepted that the Murray City School Board 
adopted a tenure progran1, then it must recognize its 
rules regarding the dismissal of a tenure teacher. All of 
the contracts provided : 
"That the Board will give the teacher a notice 
of unsatisfactory work on or before April 1 of 
the school year.'· 
rrhi8 notice not only 8hould be in writing, but it mus1 
have eontainPd a st:ate1nent of reasons for the board'~ 
n:>fusal to rP-Pltlplo~· the teaeher for the following year 
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Any such notice not incorporating reasons for doing so 
was void and did not fulfill the terms of the contract. 
See Tempe Union High School District v. Hopkins, 
262 P. 2d 387. 
The notice given :Mrs. Rees that she would not be 
re-employed as a teacher was insufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of her contract and due process of law 
under the circumstances of this case. · Teacher tenure is 
a valuable, substantial right and cannot be taken away 
except for good cause, once it is shown to exist. 
See State ex rel Saxtorph v. District Court, Fergus 
County, 275 P. 2d 209. 
Furthermore, the :Murray City Board of Education 
apparently continued the policies of Dr. Clove, and they 
should be estopped from denying the validity of Mrs. 
Rees's claims under the circumstances of this case. 
See Lommasson v. School District No. 1, 261 P. 2d 
861: 
"But school boards are not unlike the govern-
ing boards of other municipalities and corpora-
tions, and may by their subsequent acts so adopt 
or ratify contracts within the scope of their pow-
ers, informally entered into or executed, that the 
districts for which they act will be estopped to 
deny their validity. ***" 
Finally, the board offered Mrs. Rees no hearing 
at all even though her contracts from 1949 on contained 
the provision that: 
"*** there shall be no discharge without a 
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thorough investigation and a hearing before the 
board." 
Once Mrs. Rees had acquired permanent rights as 
a teacher, this right to a fair hearing, with the burden of 
proof upon the board, became clearly fixed. That this 
language was omitted from the 1953-54 contract has pre-
viously been explained and as previously urged is as 
much a condition of that contract as if it had been ex-
pressly written in. 
C. The Contract Covering the School Year 1953-54 
was not Lacking in ~Iutuality. 
The Court below raised this question, pointing out 
that paragraph -1 of the 1953-54 contract permitted ter-
mination by the teacher upon giving ten day's written 
notice. 
This provision has been previously detailed in this 
brief entirely for the benefit of the board because of the 
financial bind the school districts were in a:t the opening 
of that school tenn. School contracts had been mailed 
out and had been unsigned and returned in many in-
stances. The provision was written by the board and 
should he strictly construed against it and not the teacher. 
Does the inclusion of thi~ clause mean that the 1953· 
5-l contract was so entirely lacking in 1nutu.ality of obliga-
tion that it should not be enforced f It is an ele1nentary 
rule of contract law that unless both parties to a con-
tract an' bound, neither is bound. So tested, it is appar-
ent that :Mr~. Rees undertook to be bow1d to perfonn 
tPaeltiHg :-;pryi(·l'~ !'or tlw bo.ard for a tern1 of one year. 
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She entirely executed this contract. This is not a case 
of promised future perfonnance by a party. Here, one 
party agrees to render services in consideration of the 
other's promise to pay. Mrs. Rees was never free to re-
ject, change or alter her own performance unless she 
exercised the ten day notice provision. There was nothing 
vague or illusory about her promise or her performance 
under that promise. The ten day reservation does not 
render the contract lacking in mutuality. 
D. The :Married Teacher Rule did not Bar Appel-
lant from Benefits of Tenure Program. 
The Court below was disturbed about the married 
teachers rule. Exhibit C (R. 24) points out that the 
policy for that year contains a married won1an's clause 
which provides : 
"The board of education may cancel this con-
tract because of marriage of a female teacher 
during the year." 
The letter of March 17, 1950, written by Dr. Clove 
establishes that any attempt to deny tenure to married, 
female teachers ought to be accompanied with a showing 
that there were unmarried teachers available for work. 
The question of married teachers was an old controversy 
having its roots in the war and postwar emergency and 
employment prograrns. Actually, there are so few single 
teachers now, male or fernale, there is no reason for a 
return of the policy .and consequently to impose the rule. 
Mrs. Rees was not disrnissed because she was a married 
teacher. Continuing rnarried teachers in employment 
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has caused no econornic problems for the board of edu. 
cation. The fact is, school boards can use as many 
teachers as are available without regard to whether they 
are married or single. 
It is important to point out that the contract for 
1953-54 entirely eliminated paragraph 6 which had ap. 
peared in the 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 contracts, but 
which was not incorporated in the August 29, 1953, con-
tract. See Exhibit 10. 
Mrs. Rees urges that if her dismissal arose because 
of her married status, such dismissal would be contrary 
to good public policy and unreasonable. This is the 
holding of State ex rel Wood v. Board of Education, 
206 sw 2d 566. 
In the opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 661, 222 
NE 2d 49-57, 123 ALR 199, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court concludes that .a contract which would exclude 
married women from public employment could have no 
real tendency to advance the public welfare, and held 
such statute unconstitutional. 
Because of such basic unfairness, and reason for 
the rule ce.ases to exist, ~Irs. Rees cannot be denied her 
tenure right on the basis of the so-called married teach-
er's clause. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND· 
ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY HOLD· 
ING THAT MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
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COULD NOT INDIVIDUALLY BE LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS 
AND WILLFUL INTERFERENCE WITH APPELLANT'S 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT ON THE SE.COND CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
Appellant's Second Cause of Action is predicated 
upon the familiar Tort Law: 
HOne who without privilege to do so induces 
or otherwise purposely eauses a third person not 
to (a) perform a contract with another or, (b) 
enter into or continue a business relationship with 
another, is liable to the other for the harm caused 
thereby." 
Re-.statement of Torts, Section 766. 
The jist of appellant's claim on her Second Cause 
of Action (See Amended Complain, R. 11) is that all 
defendant.s wrongfully conspired .and interfered with 
her right of contract for which she is entitled to dam-
ages from all who participate in such wrongful activity. 
The unjustified conduct of all the defendants in 
intefering with Mrs. Rees's contract and expectancy, 
conceding that she had tenure rights, is the tort set forth 
under her Second Cause of Action. 
The Court below reasoned that defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment must be granted as against all 
except Principal :Mortenson and Superintendent Parry, 
conceding that as against those two defendants, Mrs. 
Rees had stated a cause of action, but holding that the 
Board of Education and its officers could not induce a 
breach of it~ own contract with itself. This, we believe, 
is an oversimplification. At least, the members of the 
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board, acting outside the scope of their authority should 
have personal liability for their wrongful and tortious 
acts. Corporation officers are not shielded from indi-
vidual liability merely because their unauthorized acts 
are committed in the name of a corporation if they do or 
participate in acts clearly wrongful. Contrary rule would 
enable directors and officers of the corporation to perpe-
trate flagrant injustice behind the shield of this vicarious 
cha:vacter, even though the corporation might be insolvent 
or irresponsible. 13 Am. Jur. p. 1019, Sections 1086-87. 
See Ca1neron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 
22 Mont. 312, 56 P.ac. 358. , . 
It is a general rule that a corporation should be 
liable in damages to one injured by its acts brought about 
by conspiracy among its board members or other persons. 
13 Am. Jur. 1057, Section 1132; 4 ALR 166. 
Murray City Board of Education is a public corpo-
r,ate body having the right by statute to sue and be sued, 
and it should be required to respond for its tortious con-
duct like any other corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
A careful review of the whole record demonstrates 
what 1nay happen under the cloak of administrative 
authority. l\f rs. Rees was a dedicated public servant 
who taught satisfactorily for five full years and accepted 
heavy Pxira-<'nlTieular activities for her school. In 1953, 
she hriefl~· intt'rP~t('d herself in a respected labor organi-
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zation, The American Federation of Teachers, for which 
she was deprived of her job and career. A review of the 
whole record demonstrates that the defendants had abso-
lutely no justification for their arbitrary action except 
to punish Mrs. Rees for union interests and to forewarn 
other teachers what might be their fate. 2 
We are daily reminded of the need for more teach-
ers, certified teachers and higher educational standards. 
:More and more tax dollars are being requested to support 
our public school program. By what prerogative may a 
school board seek additional millions to improve its 
program and .at the smne time frustrate its teachers as in 
this case~ The tenure program which existed was the 
:Murray School Board's own procedure. It shopld have 
observed its procedure with a greater propriety. 
Now, while public opinion is highest, and thoughtful 
people are concerned about their public school program, 
this Court should reverse the lower Court's rulings dis-
missing the First and Second Causes of Action and re-
mand the ease for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. W. SANDACK 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
2. Notwithstanding the contracts from 1949 through 1952 
which provided that "you belong to the N.E.A., U.E.A. and 
Murray Teacher Association." 
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